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  1ABSTRACT
Relationship banking based on Okun's "customer credit markets" has important 
implications for monetary policy via the credit transmission channel. Studies of  LDC 
credit markets from this point of view seem to be scanty and this paper attempts to 
address this lacuna.  Relationship banking implies short-term disequilibrium in credit 
markets, suggesting the VECM (vector error-correction model) as an appropriate 
framework for analysis.  We develop VECM models in the Indian context (for the 
period April 1991- December 2004 using monthly data) to analyse salient features of 
the credit market.  An analysis of the ECMs (error-correction mechanisms) reveals 
that disequilibrium in the Indian credit market is adjusted via demand responses rather 
than supply responses, which is in accordance with the customer view of credit 
markets.  Further light on the working of the model is obtained through the 
"generalized"  impulse responses and "generalized" error decompositions (both of 
which are independent of the variable ordering).  Our conclusions point towards firms 
using short-term credit as a liquidity buffer.  This fact, together with the gradual 
adjustment exhibited by the "persistence profiles" provides substantive evidence in 
favour of "customer credit markets". 
 
 
Keywords:  customer credit markets - monetary policy – co-integration - impulse 
response - persistence profiles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a remarkably insightful contribution, Okun (1981) introduced the important 
distinction between “auction” and “customer” markets for products.  Auction markets 
are characterized by the absence of “price tags”, sellers being “price-takers” rather 
than  ‘price-makers’.    Such  markets  are  efficient,  with  speculators  arbitraging                      
away any unexploited profit opportunities.  However, most markets in the real world  
exhibit strong inertial tendencies, with price tags being changed infrequently and with 
a considerable lag in response to shifts in costs and demand conditions.  Okun (op. 
cit.) attributes such price inertia to “search costs” incurred by buyers in obtaining 
price and quality information from sellers, and terms such markets as “customer 
markets”. 
 
Bank-credit markets exhibit the typical features of “customer markets” (Sharpe 
(1990)).  At least three factors contribute to the building of long-term customer 
relationship between a bank and its clients (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and 
Udell (1995),  Conigliani et al (1997), Boot (2000) etc). Firstly, mechanisms to 
monitor the default risks of small borrowers are absent in the bond market, and hence 
small borrowers can only have recourse to commercial banks for meeting their credit 
needs.  Once the bank possesses information about a specific firm, this can be 
regularly updated and utilized for future transactions.  Secondly, as Hodgman (1961) 
had noted earlier, loan-relationships are reinforced by deposit relationships between 
banks and clients.  Finally, Kakes (2000),  indicates that clients are prepared to pay a 
higher interest (than they could obtain by a thorough market search),  in return for 
  3assured access to credit on easy terms throughout the cycle.  A verifiable outcome of 
“customer markets” for credit is “sticky” lending rates. Such sticky rates seem to be 
an almost universal phenomenon. 
The concept of customer credit markets has important implications for the “credit 
view” of monetary policy, elaborated in Bernanke & Gertler  (1995) (but dating back 
much earlier to Wicksell (1934) and other classical writers).  A credit channel may be 
operative either via a bank lending channel (monetary policy changes leading to 
corresponding changes in bank lending) or a “financial accelerator” channel 
(monetary policy changes impinging on the firm’s cost of borrowing through changes 
in their net worth).  A long-term bank-client relationship, of the type discussed above, 
would restrain banks from recalling loans to such clients or in raising interest rates on 
such loans when they are renewed.  The tendency is reinforced if the banks can 
readily switch between loans and other types of investments or find non-deposit 
sources of funding.  This would render the credit channel somewhat ineffective and in 
the extreme case even nullify it altogether. 
 
The present paper focuses on the Indian credit market, which has been witnessing 
major changes in the past few years
3.  The market was a highly regulated one, prior to 
the onset of structural reforms in 1991- most of the banks were government owned, 
interest rates completely regulated, a substantial portion of the credit was earmarked 
for “priority sectors”, and there was a flourishing “unorganized” market for credit.  
With the onset of liberalization in 1991, private banks (including foreign banks) were 
encouraged to start operations, interest rates were extensively deregulated, the role of 
                                                           
3 It is important to remind ourselves, that the concept of “customer” credit markets refers to bank credit 
to business firms.  Its applicability to other forms of credit i.e. by non-bank institutions on the one 
hand, and to agricultural loans on the other, is far from clear.   
 
  4directed credit was de-emphasized, the unorganized market marginalised and in 
general the credit market was substantially liberalized.  Most of the existing studies in 
the Indian context have concerned themselves with the rural credit market in which 
the role of commercial banks is important but not exclusive. 
 
In such a context, it becomes of interest to study whether the Indian credit market 
understood in the sense of bank credit to firms (see endnote 1) in the post-
liberalisation phase  could be characterized as a customer market.  No systematic 
empirical studies, seem to be available on this aspect, whether of the survey kind or of 
the econometric variety 
 
 
2  A VECM MODEL 
 
The empirical study of credit markets reflects the differing theoretical  perceptions of 
the credit phenomenon discussed above. We model the credit market as a five-
variable VECM based on the following considerations.  Our credit variable is gross 
bank credit of scheduled commercial banks but excluding credit for public food 
procurement
4, i.e. non-food bank credit (NFBC).  About 28% of non-food credit is 
directed credit (to the so-called “priority sectors” of agriculture, small scale industries 
etc.), the rest is to the corporate sector, wholesale trade, exports, consumer and 
housing finance etc. and is fully at banks’ discretion
5.  
                                                           
4 Credit for public food procurement, is a special type of credit arrangement between the government of 
India and the banking system for financing the food public distribution system (PDS).  Food credit 
currently accounts for about 8% of total bank credit.  
 
5 A priori, on theoretical grounds, priority sector lending should have been excluded from the 
modelling of the credit market, since it is not really based on profit considerations.  Unfortunately, 
  5 
The demand for credit is assumed to depend on real activity as well as the cost of 
credit.  As an indicator of real activity, we employ the index of industrial production 
(IIP), which is the only indicator of real activity available at monthly frequency. It is 
admittedly an unsatisfactory measure, since it excludes services (which are an 
increasingly important component of GDP).  Quarterly series of GDP is available, but 
only for a brief recent period (post-1996).  The cost of credit to the borrower is 
represented by the prime lending rate (PLR) of the State Bank of India, which is the 
largest commercial bank in the country, and whose PLR is regarded as a reference 
rate by the rest of the Indian banking system. 
 
The supply of credit (NFBC) depends both on the return on credit and its availability.  
The net return on credit from the bank’s point of view is the spread between the 
lending rate (proxied by the PLR) and the cost of funding.  The latter would be related 
to a short-term interest rate. In the Indian context two choices are available - the inter-
bank  call money rate (CMR) and the rate on 91-day treasury bills (TBR).  Both are 
closely watched by the monetary authorities, the CMR in this regard closely 
paralleling the Federal Funds rate in the U.S. The TBR is however more directly 
related to the long-term rate of interest, via the fortnightly auction system of treasury 
bills and dated government securities in operation by the monetary authority (Reserve 
Bank of India).  We experiment with both choices of the short-term rate of interest in 
our empirical exercise.  The theoretical justification for a credit availability variable 
comes from Jaffee & Stiglitz (1990) who building on Keynes’ (1930) concept of a 
“fringe of unsatisfied borrowers” conclude that in models allowing for credit 
                                                                                                                                                                      
monthly data is recorded for non-food credit as an aggregate with no break-up into priority and non-
priority credit. 
  6rationing, credit availability may be more important than the cost of credit.  Since 
models of customer credit markets do allow for the possibility of credit rationing, an 
availability variable is indicated.  In the Indian context, the broad money measure M3 
seems the most appropriate candidate – statistics on broader liquidity measures are not 
forthcoming on a reliable or regular basis. 
 
Thus we estimate two VECM models, which differ only in the choice of the short-
term interest rate 
 
   Model A: NFBC, CMR, PLR, IIP, M3 
Model B: NFBC, TBR, PLR, IIP, M3 
 
The variables NFBC and M3 are in real terms (the corresponding nominal magnitudes 
being deflated by the wholesale price index WPI)  All variables are in natural logs 
except the interest rate variables CMR, TBR and PLR. Our data spans the post-
liberalisation phase in India (April 1992 to December 2004) and is on a monthly 
basis. The main source of the data are the successive issues of the Handbook of 
Statistics on the Indian Economy published by the Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Both models also include two kinds of dummy variables.  Firstly, there are the centred 
seasonal dummies.   Secondly, the Basle Accord was implemented as of March 1995, 
imposing capital adequacy requirements on the Indian banking system.  The 
availability of credit is likely to be constrained by the capitalisation requirements,  
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
  7now in force.  To take account of this factor, we initially introduced a dummy variable 
D defined as 
D = 0   prior to March 1995 
D = 1   subsequent to March 1995 
But even though the Accord come into force from March 1995, it is conceivable that 
the capitalization build-up commenced at least a year earlier.  We therefore postulate 
an alternative dummy variable D* as  
D* = 0 prior to March 1994 
D* = 1 subsequent to March 1994 
 
3. ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
The first step in the estimation of the VECM is to check for the stationarity  properties 
of the variables under investigation.  This was done via the standard ADF statistics 
(with the lags being  based on the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)).  The results 
are presented in Table 1.  All the variables show strong evidence supportive of unit 
roots
6, and hence a VECM  model is in order. 
 
We next turn our attention to the selection of the orders of the VAR models.  A 
maximum order of 6 was specified and the AIC and SBC (Schwarz-Bayesian 
Criterion) are computed for Models A & B (with centred seasoned dummies and 
including D and D*  alternatively). Both criteria unanimously select the optimal order 
as 1 for Models A and B for both choices of the dummy variable D as well as D*. 
 
                                                           
6 There is some equivocation in the case of the CMR and PLR – the ADF regressions including a trend 
throw up statistics which are insignificant and marginally significant respectively.  However, the 
trend term itself was insignificant in both  these cases, and in the models without trend, the ADF 
statistics are significant as Table 1 shows. 
  8We also test for the significance of the dummy variables via a likelihood ratio (LR) 
test.  The LR statistic was insignificant for the seasonal dummies and D together, but 
was highly significant when D was replaced by D* (in both Models A and B)
7. Thus, 
our Models A and B both include D* and the seasonal dummies as exogenous 
variables, and are modelled as VARs of order 1. 
 
It is now possible to estimate the member of co-integrating relations in our models.  It 
is usual to distinguish the following 5 cases, depending on the cointegration VAR 
specification. 
 
1.  No intercepts or trends in the VAR 
2.  Restricted intercepts, no trends 
3.  Unrestricted intercepts, no trends 
4.  Unrestricted intercepts, restricted trends 
5. Unrestricted  intercepts, unrestricted trends 
 
The importance of distinguishing between these cases is discussed in detail in Franses 
(1998).  The choice between the 5 cases is guided by the so-called Pantula principle 
explained in Hansen & Juselius (1995).  The application of this principle in our case 
leads to the choice of specification 2 (ie. restricted intercepts and no trends) for both 
Models A & B. The maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics for Models A and B are 
presented in Table 2 and 3 respectively, and for both models, the 2 tests unanimously 
suggest the number of cointegrating vectors r as r = 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
7 Thus capitalization of banks seems to have impacted on credit availability at least a year ahead of the 
actual implementation.   
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The unrestricted cointegrating vectors are displayed in Table 4.  A priori one expects 
credit demand (NFBC) to be negatively related to the PLR and positively related to 
the index of industrial production IIP, while credit supply is expected to be positively 
related to the return on credit (PLR) and negatively related to its cost (CMR or TBR), 
and perhaps additionally also positively related to credit availability (as proxied by 
money supply M3)  Thus cointegrating vector 2 and 3 (for both models)  are potential 
credit demand and credit supply equations.  The interpretation of cointegrating vector 
1 is unclear at the moment. It could either be a money demand function or a money 
supply reaction function of the monetary authorities, which can only be decided after 
further analysis. 
 
We now impose restrictions on the cointegrating vectors for identifying the system.  
Since the number of cointegrating vectors is r = 3, we need to impose three 
restrictions on each vector for exact identification (see Johansen (1988, 1991)).  We 
impose the following exact restrictions (for both models) 
 
i)  C1 (1)  =  C1 (3) = 0; C1 (5) = 1 
ii)  C2 (1) = 1; C2 (2) = C2 (5) = 0 
iii)  C3 (1) = 1; C3 (4) = 0; C3 (2) + C3 (3) = 0 
 
Where CI (J) refers to the coefficient of the Jth variable in the Ith cointegrating vector 
(The ordering of the variables is as per Table 4) 
 
The rationale for the imposed restrictions is as follows .   
  10As stated earlier, the first cointegrating vector could be either a money demand 
equation or a money supply reaction function. The relevant interest rate for either 
interpretation is the cost of funds (CMR in Model A or TBR in Model B), not the 
PLR.  The NFBC or credit variable also does not figure in any conventional money 
demand or supply function.  Thus we do not expect the first cointegrating vector to 
include either PLR or NFBC.  Hence C1 (1) = C1 (3) = 0.  The remaining restriction 
(i.e. C1 (5) = 1) is simply a normalizing restriction. 
 
The cost of credit for borrowers is indicated by the PLR, and the CMR or TBR is 
irrelevant for the borrower’s decision.  Similarly M3 does not influence the demand 
for credit.  Hence for the second cointegrating vector we impose the normalizing 
restriction C2 (1) = 1 and the two exclusion restrictions C2 (2) = 0, C2 (5) = 0 
 
The supply of credit depends on the spread i.e. the difference between the return on 
loans to banks (PLR) and the cost of funds (CMR or TBR), and the availability of 
credit proxied by M3.  The activity variable IIP influences the demand for credit but 
not the willingness to supply credit.  Thus, on the third cointegrating vector, we 
impose the normalizing restriction C3 (1) = 1, the exclusion restriction C3 (4) = 0, and 
the spread restriction C3 (2) + C3 (3) = 0 
 
Apart from the above exact identification restrictions, we also impose an additional 
restriction to test whether the availability variable M3 affects credit supply.  Thus we 
impose the over-identification restriction. 
C3 (5) = 0 
  11The testing of such over-identifying restrictions is discussed in Pesaran (!997) and 
Pesaran & Shin (1996).   
 
The estimated cointegrating vectors under the above restrictions together with the 
likelihood ratio (LR) statistics for the over-identifying restriction is presented in Table 
5.  The LR statistic does not reject the restriction (at 5% level) for both Model A as 
well as Model B. 
The long-term cointegrating relations can be written down as  
                        M3       =   0.4154 + 1.5665
** (IIP) – 0.01956
* (CMR) 
Model A  NFBC
d = -0.0142 + 1.6005
** (IIP) – 0.0012 (PLR) 
  N F B C




    M3       =  1.1552 + 1.4406
** (IIP) – 0.0440
** (TBR)    
Model B   NFBC
d = -0.6922 + 1.7017
** (IIP) – 0.0075 (PLR)   
  N F B C
s =   8.8501 + 0.2666





s are demand for and supply of credit respectively and (*) and (**) 
devote significance at 5% and 10% levels). 
Thus, with the over-identifying restrictions in place, the three cointegrating vectors in 
both models A and B, can sustain the interpretation of a demand for money function, 
a credit demand and a credit supply equation respectively.  The long-term income 
elasticity of the demand for money is in the range 1.44 to 1.56, whereas that of the 
  12demand for credit is between 1.60 to 1.70, over the two model versions.  The spread 
variable emerges significant for the credit supply equation only in Model B.  This 
accords with the empirical observation that the CMR variable exhibits considerable 
overall variability and hence, long-term credit supply decisions are more likely to be 
based on TBR as a measure of the cost of funds to banks.  The elasticities of the 
interest rate variables are only semi-elasticities
8 and hence have to be multiplied by 
the corresponding average values of the interest rate variables to obtain the elasticites 
at the mean. The relevant elasticities are presented in Table 6 
 
While both Models A and B throw up similar conclusions, the latter specification 
seems slightly superior in view of the TBR being a more reliable indicator of the cost 
of short-term funds to banks than CMR.  Hence in the following sections, our 
interpretations will be primarily focused on Model B, with a view to rendering the 
discussion more compact. Where it is deemed relevant, the results from Model A will 
be presented alongside too. 
 
4.  LONG-RUN STRUCTURAL MODELLING 
In Table 7, we take a look at the factor loadings for Model B; these loadings indicate 
the speed of convergence of each variable towards the long-run equilibrium (ie. 
cointegrating relations), and correspond to the columns of the matrix α in Johansen & 
Juselius (1990).  Reading across the rows, it appears that NFBC adjusts only towards 
the credit demand equation, the adjustment to the credit supply equation being 
insignificant.  There is also a small but significant adjustment in the direction of the 
money demand vector. Thus, it is suggested that the market for bank credit, in the 
                                                           
8 Recalling that all variables are in logs, except the interest rate variables 
  13short-run, is dominated by demand rather than supply.  Similarly, the level of 
industrial activity IIP is seen to adjust in the direction of credit demand rather than 




An important facet of long-run structural analysis is represented by impulse response 
functions.  These measure the time profile of the effect of a shock in the system to the 
various component series. Traditional impulse response analysis (e.g. Enders (1995)) 
suffers from the well-known limitation that the impact weights are dependent on the 
ordering of the variables  in the VAR, rendering interpretation difficult.  To overcome 
this limitation, Gallant et.al (1993) and Koop et.al (1996) introduce the concept of 
generalized impulse responses, which are independent of the ordering of the variables.  
These generalized impulse responses are the difference between the expectation of a 
future value of the variable conditioned on the shock and the history of the system and 
its expectation conditioned on its history alone
10. This, of course, requires some 
assumption about the distribution of the shocks, which is generally taken to be 
multivariate Gaussian.  We present the generalized impulse responses of all the 
variables in the system to shocks in the credit variable (NFBC) in Fig. 1, whereas, 
Fig. 2, traces the response of NFBC to shocks in the other variables. Both sets of 
impulse responses have been computed for upto 24 months ahead.  From the first 
group of figures, it is evident that shocks to NFBC have pronounced effects on the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
9  The positive ( and significant) factor loadings obtained for IIP and PLR in Table 7, are correct since 
IIP and PLR enter with negative signs in cointegrating vectors 2 and 3 respectively 
 
10 Thus, if yt+n  is the future value of the variable at time (t+n), vt  the current shock and 
    wt-1 the history of the system, the generalised impulse responses is given by 
 
     GIy = E(yt+n / vt,  wt-1) – E(yt+n / wt-1)   n = 0,1,2 
 
  14interest variables, PLR and TB91 as well as IIP.  The second group of figures shows 
that NFBC does not respond significantly to any of the other variables – it responds 
marginally to shocks in IIP, PLR and TBR.  The negative response of NFBC to M3 
shocks, for the first few periods, seems to be in line with the buffer stock view of 
firms’ liquidity holdings, wherein short-term credit acts as a liquidity buffer. Firms 
under this supposition, respond to a monetary contraction by increasing their demand 
for short-term credit (see De Haan et. al (1994) and Kakes (2000)).  The second set of 
figures shows how shocks to NFBC have pronounced effects on the interest rate 
variables
11, and also significant effects on IIP. 
 
The generalized forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD’s) present essentially 
the same information in a different form (see Tables 8 and 9).  Table 8 yields 
evidence favouring the importance of NFBC in explaining FEVD of IIP and (to a 
lesser extent) that of TBR.  The FEVD of NFBC are explained primarily in terms of 
its own movements, with some contributions from TBR, PLR and IIP  in that order. 
 
A very useful additional tool for the analysis of cointegrated systems has been 
recently furnished by Pesaran & Shin (1996) in the form of “persistence profiles”.  
These document the time response of the effects of system-wide shocks on the 
cointegrating relations of the model.  They thus indicate the speed with which an 
economy reverts to equilibrium, subsequent to a shock.  The profiles are invariant to 
the ordering of the variables, thus circumventing the “non-uniqueness” problem. The 
persistence profiles for our system are displayed in Table 10.  An interesting pattern is 
                                                           
11 It has to be remembered that the impulse responses focus on shocks to NFBC in isolation, and hence 
the dramatic rise in interest rates.  In practices, such shocks would be compensated by matching 
changes in the availability of credit (M3). 
 
  15thrown up by the table.  Whereas the adjustment to equilibrium in the case of the 
money demand function (represented by the first cointegrating vector) is fairly rapid 
(being almost complete in less than 6 months)  that for the credit demand and supply 
equations stretches out to about 15 months.  The rapid convergence of the money 
market equation is possibly attributable to the money market being dominated by 
financial institutions with sophisticated information technology. The slow 
convergence of the credit market furnishes indirect evidence supporting the “customer 
view” of this market.  Banks do not adjust their loan portfolios in the short-run, 
preferring to adjust via securities instead.  Similarly, firms may be following a 




Systematic studies of the credit market in India have been lacking and the present 
paper tries to address this lacuna.  We build a model of the Indian credit market, 
focussing on non-food bank credit (NFBC) in the post–1991 (liberalisation period).  
The theoretical basis for the model is the “customer” view of credit markets 
introduced by Okun (1981) (also termed as “relationship banking” in the later 
literature).  Such a view also has important implications for the “credit channel” 
version of monetary policy. 
 
Disequilibrium in the credit market emerges as a distinct possibility in models of this 
genre, and  hence an appropriate methodology for modelling in this context, becomes 
the VECM.  We build two version of a VECM for the Indian credit market – Model A 
based on the call money rate as an index of the cost of funds to the banking system 
  16and Model B using the 91-day Treasury Bill rate as a proxy for this cost.  Both models 
throw up three cointegrating relations which sustain the interpretations of a money 
demand, a credit demand and a credit-supply equation respectively.  Identifying 
restrictions were imposed on each model, to test various restrictions suggested by the 
theory, and were found congruent to the data.  However, on diagnostic counts, Model 
B emerged somewhat superior, and further analysis was focussed on this version only. 
 
An analysis of the ECMs (error correction mechanisms) revealed that disequilibrium 
in the credit market is rectified via demand rather than supply factors, which is 
consistent with the customer view of credit markets.  Further insights into the working 
of the model is provided by the generalized impulse responses and the generalized 
forecast error  variance  decompositions.  Those measures share the important feature 
of being independent of the ordering of the variables, which makes for a substantial 
improvement over the traditional counterparts of these measures.  The analysis of 
both sets of generalized measures seems to suggest that firms use short-term credit as 
a liquidity buffer which could be interpreted as additional indirect evidence in favour 
of the customer view of credit markets.  More direct evidence for the customer view, 
comes from the “persistence profiles”, which exhibit a very slow adjustment to 
equilibrium in the credit market (Table 10). 
 
Thus our empirical analysis adduces considerable support for Okun’s original 
conception of the functioning of credit markets.  This analysis needs to be 
supplemented by survey studies of Indian banks and firms.  Admittedly, such surveys 
are difficult to execute but they can throw considerable insight into the actual 
mechanisms underlying the customer relationships.  Additionally, surveys can throw 
  17up useful disaggregative information by disaggregating across borrower categories 
(e.g. small firms, households, large firms etc.)  as well as loan types (short-term and 
long-term).   
 
The aggregative nature of econometric studies and degrees of freedom constraints 
imposed on econometric models are well-known limitations and our model is no 
exception.  Nevertheless, as a starting point, it can lay claim to some merit for 
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TABLES 
     
 




Variables  Model without Trend  Model with Trend 
  Lag ADF Lag ADF 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1.  IIP  12 0.47** 12 -2.65* 
2. PLR  3  -0.92**  3  -3.41* 
3. CMR  3  -2.62*  1  -5.19 
4. TBR  1  -2.18*  1  -2.15* 
5.  NFBC  12 0.11** 12 -2.91* 
6. M3  1  -1.07**  1  -1.83** 
 
Notes: (i) (*) and (**) denote significance at 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Cointegration Tests for Model A
 
Maximal Eigen Value Test  Trace Test 












(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
r=0  r = 1  83.13*  34.40  31.73  R=0 r ≥ 1  194.73* 75.98  71.81 
r≤1  r = 2  58.42*  28.27  25.80  R≤1r   ≥ 2  111.61* 53.48  49.95 
r≤2  r = 3  42.06*  22.04  19.86  R≤2r   ≥ 3  53.18* 34.87  31.93 
r≤3  r = 4  6.31  15.87  13.81  R≤3r   ≥ 4  11.12 20.18  17.88 
r≤4  r = 5  4.80  9.16  7.53  R≤4 r = 5  4.81  9.16  7.53 
 
Notes : (i)  The tests are for the specification 2 (restricted intercepts, no trends) 
            (ii)  (*) denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Cointegration Tests for Model B
 
 
Maximal Eigen Value Test  Trace Test 












(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
r=0  r = 1  78.20*  34.40  31.73  r=0  r ≥ 1  165.58* 75.98  71.81 
r≤1  r = 2  42.93*  28.27  25.80  r≤1 r  ≥ 2  87.38* 53.48  49.95 
r≤2  r = 3  34.43*  22.04  19.86  r≤2 r  ≥ 3  44.45* 34.87  31.93 
r≤3  r = 4  8.13  15.87  13.81  r≤3 r  ≥ 4  10.02 20.18  17.88 
r≤4  r = 5  1.90  9.16  7.53  r≤4 r  ≥ 5  1.89 9.16  7.53 
 





Cointegration Relationships for Models A and B
 
 
  27Model A  Model B 
Variables  Vector 1  Vector 2  Vector 3  Variables  Vector 1  Vector 2  Vector 3 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
1. NFBC  -0.75  -0.98 -1.11 1. NFBC  0.526 1.781  1.458
2. CMR  0.004  0.015 -0.007 2. CMR  0.017 -0.042  0.025
3. PLR  0.007  -0.03 0.017 3. PLR  -0.058 0.045  -0.049
4. IIP  0.07  1.88 1.92 4. IIP  -0.047 -2.597  -2.967
5. M3  0.74  -0.32 0.015 5. M3  -0.823 0.016  0.097
Intercept  -0.40 1.15 -1.03 Intercept 3.22 -1.42 2.91
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Model A  Model B 
Variables  Vector 1  Vector 2  Vector 3  Variables  Vector 1  Vector 2  Vector 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
1. NFBC  0.0000  1.0000 1.0000 1. NFBC  0.0000 1.0000  1.0000
2. CMR  0.01956  0.0000 0.3443 2. CMR  0.0440 0.0000  0.2666
3. PLR  0.0000  0.0012 -0.3443 3. PLR  0.0000 0.0075  -0.2666
4. IIP  -1.5665  -1.6005 0.0000 4. IIP  -1.4406 -1.7017  0.0000
5. M3  1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 5. M3  1.0000 0.0000  0.0000
Intercept -0.4154  0.0142 -7.9307 Intercept -1.1552 0.6922 -8.8501
LR = 1.7835  LR = 1.7572 
 
Note: (i) LR denotes the likelihood ratio statistic for testing the over-identifying 
restriction C3(5) = 0. This ratio is distributed as  . Both LR are 
insignificant at 5% levels. 
2









  Model A  Model B 








   CMR PLR  Spread 
(PLR-
CMR) 
 TBR  PLR  Spread 
(PLR- 
TBR) 










1.6005 -----  -
0.0179 





----  ----- -----  1.3100 -------  ---- -----  1.014 
 
Note: (i) All the interest elasticities are at the mean. 
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Notes: (i)  (*) and (**) denote significance at 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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TABLE 8
 
Role of NFBC in the FEVD of all Variables 
 
 
Horizon IIP  PLR  TBR NFBC  M3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0  0.0002 0.0645 0.1226 1.0000  0.0028 
1  0.0308 0.0589 0.1186 0.9800 0.0043 
2  0.0801 0.0567 0.1157 0.9517 0.0042 
3  0.1327 0.0561 0.1138 0.9242 0.0041 
4  0.1811 0.0562 0.1124 0.9006 0.0048 
5  0.2236 0.0565 0.1115 0.8811 0.0061 
6  0.2604 0.0569 0.1110 0.8650 0.0076 
7  0.2924 0.0573 0.1106 0.8517 0.0091 
8  0.3204 0.0576 0.1105 0.8406 0.0106 
9  0.3451 0.0579 0.1104 0.8312 0.0119 
10  0.3672 0.0582 0.1103 0.8232  .0130 
11  0.3870 0.0584 0.1103 0.8163 0.0139 
12  0.4049 0.0586 0.1104 0.8104 0.0148 
13  0.4211 0.0587 0.1104 0.8051 0.0156 
14  0.4359 0.0588 0.1165 0.8005 0.0163 
15  0.4495 0.0590 0.1105 0.7965 0.0169 
  3316  0.4619 0.0590 0.1106 0.7928 0.0174 
17  0.4735 0.0591 0.1106 0.7896 0.0179 
18  0.4842 0.0592 0.1107 0.7867 0.0184 
19  0.4941 0.0593 0.1107 0.7841 0.0188 
20  0.5034 0.0593 0.1107 0.7817 0.0192 
21  0.5120 0.0594 0.1108 0.7795 0.0195 
22  0.5201 0.0594 0.1108 0.7775 0.0199 
23  0.5278 0.0595 0.1109 0.7757 0.0202 
24  0.5348 0.0595 0.1109 0.7740 0.0205 
 
Notes: (i) FEVD – (Generalised) forecast error variance decomposition 
           (ii) Each column shows the proportion of variance of the captional variable 
explained by NFBC.  
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Generalised FEVD for NFBC 
 
 
Horizon Iip  PLR  TBR NFBC M3   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
0 0.000168  0.054197 0.103017 0.840266 0.002353  1.1901
1 0.010181  0.061425 0.08863 0.838395 0.001369  1.1689
2 0.025503  0.067922 0.079979 0.825555 0.001041  1.1528
3 0.040704  0.073792 0.07563 0.808999 0.000875  1.1424
4 0.053493  0.079008 0.074345 0.792363 0.000792  1.1366
5 0.063145  0.083693 0.075403 0.777053 0.000706  1.1339
6 0.070149  0.087973 0.077914 0.763258 0.000706  1.1333
7 0.075234  0.091639 0.081231 0.751191 0.000706  1.1338
8 0.078773  0.094898 0.08503 0.740682 0.000617  1.1349
9 0.081309  0.097677 0.088965 0.731433 0.000616  1.1364
10 0.083048  0.100185 0.092803 0.723438 0.000527  1.1379
11 0.084335  0.102326 0.096446 0.716367 0.000527  1.1395
12 0.085261  0.104276 0.099807 0.71013 0.000526  1.1412
13 0.085952  0.105908 0.10302 0.704683 0.000438  1.1425
14 0.086459  0.107439 0.105866 0.699799 0.000437  1.1439
15 0.086877  0.108792 0.108443 0.695451 0.000437  1.1453
16 0.08715  0.109919 0.110878 0.691617 0.000436  1.1463
17 0.087407  0.111024 0.113115 0.688105 0.000349  1.1475
18 0.087672  0.111962 0.115097 0.684921 0.000348  1.1486
19 0.087777  0.112832 0.11692 0.682123 0.000348  1.1495
20 0.087969  0.113613 0.118567 0.679503 0.000348  1.1504
  3521 0.088018  0.114345 0.12008 0.677296 0.000261  1.1509
22 0.088138  0.11497 0.121483 0.675148 0.000261  1.1516
23 0.088251  0.115585 0.122787 0.673117 0.00026  1.1524
24 0.088299  0.116142 0.123948 0.671351 0.00026  1.1529
 
Notes:  (i) FEVD – Generalised forecast error variance decomposition 
            (ii) Each column shows the proportion of the variance in NFBC attributable to 
the captioned column variable.  





Horizon CV1  CV2  CV3 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
0  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1  0.2426 0.9344 0.9601 
2  0.0772 0.8762 0.9077 
3  0.0340 0.8154 0.8632 
4  0.0186 0.7764 0.8059 
5  0.0111 0.7003 0.7550 
6  0.0068 0.6418 0.6885 
7  0.0042 0.5772 0.6104 
8  0.0026 0.5108 0.5657 
9  0.0015 0.4741 0.5099 
10  0.0009 0.4092 0.4326 
11  0.0005 0.3416 0.3815 
12  0.0003 0.3187 0.3384 
13  0.0002 0.2549 0.2762 
14  0.0001 0.1765 0.1806 
15  Negligible 0.0908  0.1113 
16  --“ --  0.0315  0.0882 
  3717  --“ --  0.0098  0.0174 
18  --“ --  0.0042  0.0081 
19  --“ --  0.0026  0.0004 
20  --“ --  0.0005  Negligible 
21  --“ --  Negligible  --“ -- 
22  --“ --  --“ --  --“ -- 
23  --“ --  --“ --  --“ -- 
24  --“ --  --“ --  --“ -- 
 
Notes:  (i) CV1, CV2 and CV3 are the 3  cointegrating vectors of our system, which 
have been interpreted earlier as the money demand equation, credit 
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Note: The variables, which have been "shocked" are mentioned in the top of each box. 
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